Strategic Thinking

The turning point of World War II in Europe was the Allied triumph in a battle of minds. In effect, the Allies fought and won battles using armies that did not exist. The fictional British 4th. Army froze 13 German divisions in place in Norway, while the Germans held its 15th. Army in reserve in the Pas de Calais region waiting for an attack by the equally fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG). Thanks to these two gallant but ghostly armies, the flesh-and-blood forces that participated in the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day faced a diluted and relatively weak German Army.

The military historian Liddell Hart once said that the purpose of strategy is “to diminish the possibility of resistance.” “Even if a decisive battle be the goal,” he says, “the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances and the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.” To ensure a position of advantage on D-Day, Allied strategy called for keeping the German Army too dispersed to mount an effective counterattack.

The super-ordinate objective of the Normandy invasion was clear. The Allies sought total victory in Europe, culminating in the defeat of Hitler’s last defenses in Berlin. The “beginning of the end,” as Winston Churchill called it, was the establishment of a beachhead, or lodgment, that would serve as a safe entry point into Europe by the Allied forces.

Because of the difficulty of landing an army on well-defended beaches, Allied planners had to identify or create elements of strategic advantage. If the German generals knew in advance exactly where to expect the invasion, they would gather all of their defenses in just the right spot to counter the allies. Thus, it was critical to spread the German defenses across the western coast of Europe so that few would be present at the eventual point of attack.

The Allies used a variety of misinformation techniques to convince Hitler that there were 350,000 Allied soldiers stationed in Scotland, ready to invade Europe through its northern regions. They invented a fictitious British 4th Army, code-named Skye, and touted it as the spearhead of the coming invasion of Norway and Scandinavia. By April of 1944, the radio and airwaves over Scotland were humming with communications about the bustling movement of brigades and equipment in preparation for an overseas assault. One easily “intercepted” message planted by the Allies contained an order for 1,800 pairs of crampons and as many snow ski bindings.

The Germans monitored these communications and received confirmations from their own spies, who, in truth, were double agents working for the Allies. They also sent aerial reconnaissance over Scotland to get a look for themselves. German reconnoiters took pictures of hundreds of tanks and airplanes poised for the invasion. What their photographs did not reveal was that the planes were empty shells made of plywood and that the tanks were rubber “blow-up” models.

Meanwhile, the press in neutral Sweden carried (true) accounts of Allied engineers measuring the height of tunnels through which tanks and troop carriers might pass, as they conducted “preparations” for the coming invasion of Germany through northern Europe. The subterfuge, on its many fronts, worked. In the end, dozens of German divisions missed many critical battles in France while they waited in the north countries for the non-existent armies to arrive from the British Isles.

Thus the Allies won the battle of minds, through this and other even more important “ruse strategies.” Misleading the enemy is a stratagem dating back not centuries but millennia. As Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War, “All war is based on deception.” To him, the greatest battle was the one not fought. (Wikipedia)

Detail Assessment and Planning (Chinese: 始計): explores the five fundamental factors (the way, seasons, terrain, leadership, and management) and seven elements that determine the outcomes of military engagements. By thinking, assessing and comparing these points, a commander can calculate his chances of victory. Habitual deviation from these calculations will ensure failure via improper action. The text stresses that war is a very grave matter for the state and must not be commenced without due consideration. (Sun Tzu 5th Century B.C.)

Spread and Focus Strategy

D-Day called for one of the most critical spread and focus strategies in history. The Allies needed an entry into Europe that would maximize their chances of success while minimizing the risk to lives and military assets. The map of Europe prior to D-Day illustrates how they arrived at their brilliant solution.

First, look at the extreme breadth of the Russian front. Keeping Germany occupied with a two-front war, which meant maintaining a coalition with Stalin and the Soviets, was a critical element of Allied strategy. As Americans, we remember the drama of D-Day, the liberation of Paris, and the Battle of the Bulge.But it was the “Barbarossa” campaign – a battle of unprecedented size between Russia and Germany - that made the invasion from the West possible. More than a million German soldiers were occupied on the eastern front on D-Day, when the Allies invaded the western front.

Second, take a glance at Scotland, facing Norway to the east. Norway was important to Hitler as the home of his U-boat bases. Taking advantage of the geographic proximity of Scotland to northern Europe, Allied leaders developed a strategy called Fortitude North. The Fortitude North ruse was intended to freeze in place the thirteen army divisions (over 130,000 soldiers, not to mention 90,000 navy and 60,000 Luftwaffe personnel) that Hitler had stationed in Norway, Denmark, and Finland. (note – I have seen estimates up to 27 divisions.) To create a credible threat to the north, the Allies needed some loud saber-rattling in Scotland.

The military historian Liddell Hart says that the purpose of strategy is “to diminish the possibility of resistance.” “Even if a decisive battle be the goal,” he says, “the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.” To ensure a position of advantage on D-Day, Allied strategy called for keeping the German army too dispersed to mount an effective counterattack.

He who defends everything, defends nothing. - Frederick the Great

The Allies used a variety of misinformation techniques to convince Hitler that there were 350,000 Allied soldiers stationed in Scotland, ready to invade Europe through its northern regions. They invented a fictitious British 4th Army, code-named Skye, and touted it as the spearhead of the coming invasion of Norway and Scandinavia. By April of 1944, the radio and airwaves over Scotland were humming with communications about the bustling movement of brigades and equipment in preparation for an overseas assault. One easily “intercepted” message planted by the Allies contained an order for 1,800 pairs of crampons and as many snow ski bindings.

The Germans monitored these communications and received confirmations from their own spies, who, in truth, were double agents working for the Allies. They also sent aerial reconnaissance over Scotland to get a look for themselves. German reconnoiters took pictures of hundreds of tanks and airplanes poised for the invasion. What their photographs did not reveal was that the planes were empty shells made of plywood and that the tanks and aircraft were rubber “blow-up” models.

The Operational or Campaign Map View

To understand the narrower scope of the operational, as opposed to strategic, tier of decision-making, let us zoom in on a D-Day map of Southern Britain and French Normandy- map below. Remember that in military parlance, a campaign is a series of related operations aimed at accomplishing an objective within a specific time and space. While the Normandy campaign was but one phase in the overall Allied strategy, it nonetheless required full-time work from tens of thousands of people in the weeks and months that preceded it.

In all cases, operational planning begins with a statement of strategy and objectives. In January of 1943, a year and a half prior to D-Day, the objective of the invasion was stated in this manner:

The object of Operation “Overlord” is to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st of May, 1944, to secure lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgment area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at a rate of three to five divisions per month.

This statement of purpose clarified an exact and narrow objective and allowed planning to proceed.

Once purpose is stated, it is always important to articulate a set of operating principles that will further guide decision-making. Plans for the Normandy campaign were partly based on a set of principles developed under the leadership of Brigadier General John W. O’Daniel and published in May of 1943, a little over a year before D-Day. Just as many business leaders glean useful ideas from the words of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Napoleon, so might we draw on O’Daniel and his team for insight into operational planning. The following are extracted from the list:

Some of these principles were violated on D-Day itself, to the detriment of the landing forces. But, clearly, principles like these, calling for clarity of leadership, flexibility of personnel, actionable intelligence, tactical decision-making at the point of attack, and contingency planning are useful in any operational planning effort.

The next step in operational planning is an assessment of the strategic situation. In the case of war, intelligence gathering would include assessment of “enemy strength, locations and abilities; the types, quantities, and quality of troops and equipment available; and the terrain on which the battles would be fought.” In the beginning, Normandy campaign planners had more information on the enemy’s resources than on their own.

Next, a number of decisions are to be made. For the Normandy campaign these included the exact landing sites; the order in which men and equipment would arrive; the time and date of invasion; the extent of preliminary bombardment needed to weaken German defenses without providing the enemy undue warning. “…you’re going to find confusion.” General Norman Cota preparing his men for D-Day

In a sense, operational planning is the bridge from strategic intent to what actually happens. Despite the incredible amount of planning prior to D-Day, the operation itself ended up vastly different than conceived. Stormy weather, failed technology, and human error led to many unforeseen circumstances. On June 5, known as D minus One, General Norman Cota, a particularly strong operational leader, warned his troops to expect the unexpected:

“This is different from any of the exercises you’ve had so far. The little discrepancies that we tried to correct on Slapton Sands [the site of a practice operation on England’s southern coast] are going to be magnified and are going to give way to incidents that you might at first view as chaotic. The air and naval bombardment and the artillery support are reassuring. But you’re going to find confusion. The landing craft aren’t going in on schedule and people are going to be landed in the wrong place. Some won’t be landed at all. The enemy will try, and will have some success, in preventing our gaining lodgment. But we must improvise, carry on, and not lose our heads.” (N.C.)

General Cota’s words, as we know, were prescient. No operational plan should come without this kind of warning. It is unrealistic to expect that any plan at the operational or campaign level can outline what to do under all contingencies. People must be aware that there will be confusion and foggy circumstances ahead. Communication like Cota’s provides the best transition to the realm of tactical, on-the-ground decision-making.

Finally, we pan in on the map once more (pg. 04) to view an area of just a few acres to the east of the invasion site. As noted, Allied strategy succeeded in dispersing German forces just prior to D-Day. Still, once alarmed, the Germans were sure to mount a counterattack from the east as quickly as possible. Allied operational planning called for sealing off the eastern flank of the invasion area, defined by the Orne River and the Caen Canal. Two critical bridges stood between the German reinforcements and the Normandy beaches where thousands of vulnerable soldiers were landing. These bridges came to be known as the Pegasus and Horsa bridges.

In two tactical skirmishes that lasted only hours during the night before to the Allied landing, two gliders carrying X men landed near the bridges, and after a short firefight, American platoons ousted the German guards and took control of this essential pinch point. (In other words, everything went according to plan.)

A third planned skirmish involved the destruction of a battery of artillery the Germans had moved from the French Maginot Line to ground outside the Normandy town of Merville. A force of 750 airborne troops was assigned to attack and destroy these “guns of Merville” during the night before D-Day. A British officer named T.B.H. Otway was assigned to lead the effort.

In contrast to the attacks on the Pegasus and Horsa bridges, there was little in common between the operational planning for the Merville maneuvers and their actual execution. Rather, everything went wrong for Otway and his troops. Pilots panicked in the face of anti-aircraft flak and dropped many paratroopers too far from the target area to participate in the operation. Critical equipment, including mortars, mine detectors, radios, and weapons, were not recovered after being dropped from the air. More important, a planned air attack to drop bombs in order to create foxholes to protect the assaulting soldiers failed when all the bombs missed their target. But Otway displayed good judgment under fire and improvised solutions. The men on the ground adjusted to unanticipated and quickly changing circumstances, deviating significantly from the operational plan. In the end, through heroic and brave efforts, Otway and his men drove the Germans out of the area and rendered the guns of Merville useless.They succeeded because of excellent tactical decision-making.

The Storm

Bad luck, in the form of a ferocious summer storm, the worst June gale in 40 years, blew in on June 19 (D plus 13). It came from the north, the worst possible direction, piling up the seas against the beaches, creating a barrier of surf no landing craft could penetrate intact.

In three days of unrelenting fury, it all but demolished the American harbor, tossing smaller vessels athwart the causeways and creating general wreckage. The spuds were ruined, and most of Mulberry A was left good for nothing but repair parts for the British harbor.

The British port sustained heavy damage too, but, partly sheltered by the Calvados Reef, it was much less damaged than its American counterpart and it was quickly restored to service.

In fact, the American Mulberry was a work in progress throughout its short life. It began receiving ships while its facilities were still being installed, and its installation as designed was never completed. But even as major elements were being destroyed by the storm, essential activity went on at both harbors. The SHAEF report previously quoted observed:

The harbors had been designed to insure against precisely this emergency; but unfortunately the sudden gale caught them before they were finished and before the whole of the breakwaters had been laid. Moreover, whereas we had taken the possibility of a summer gale into our calculation, this gale was of winter strength.

An extremely dangerous situation arose. The [Bombardon] breakwater broke up and ceased to give any protection. Both outside the harbours and within them there were ships in distress, ships dragging their anchors or whose anchors were already lost. These threatened further to damage the structure of breakwater and piers.

The American harbour was the worse hit. Great seas surged through the gaps torn in the breakwater, drove small craft ashore, and seriously damaged the piers. Caissons [Phoenixes] which had been breached by pieces of wreckage began to crumble away.

However, the harbour and separate "shelters" were already to a great extent performing the function for which they had been designed. A very large number of ships and craft found sanctuary under the lee of the blockships and within the harbour breakwaters. Ships in distress, which would otherwise have been lost with their valuable cargoes, were saved by the friendly shelter of the artificial harbours.

And for three days of appalling weather, while beach unloading was impossible and the Army's supply situation became extremely difficult, a small but very vitally important trickle of stores went ashore through the harbour. Even on the worst day of the gale, 800 tons of petrol and ammunition as well as many hundreds of troops, were landed at Arromanches over the pierheads. Next day, while the gale still raged, this was increased to 1200.

Great damage was sustained by the American harbour, which lacked the useful shelter which the Calvados reef provided for the British; and to make matters worse many of the components – caissons and lengths of pier – were lost or damaged while on tow in the Channel during the three days' gale.

In view of these heavy losses of material it was decided to discontinue work on this harbour, which was now less necessary in view of the capture of Cherbourg. The main structure of the British port had stood up well to the weather, and the harbour was completed – partly with material salvaged from the American one. The work of strengthening its breakwaters is still proceeding.

Meanwhile the port continues in full operation. Within its breakwaters Liberty ships and coasters discharge their cargoes into DUKWs ["Ducks"] and lighters; and against its pierheads other ships unload thousands of tons each day into lorries which carry the stores straight to the Army's dumps.

Through the two harbors came 73,000 U.S. and 83,000 British and Canadian troops. As the SHAEF report put it, "For the first time in history, a harbour has been built in sections, towed across the sea, and set down, during a battle, on the enemy shore." And be it noted: towed across the sea, and set down, during a battle, on the enemy shore by the gallant men of the United States Merchant Marine and Naval Armed Guard, and their British and Canadian counterparts.

http://www.strategybydesign.org/d-day-strategy-and-the-normandy-invasion/